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accurately, it has done its job. This, Rights of Person has generally
done.
Frank William Neuber
Professor of Government
Western Kentucky University
TR WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
REFORM. By Archibald Cox. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1968. Pp. 144. $4.50
Archibald Cox begins this brief and incisive study of the Warren
Court by recalling that "de Tocqueville wrote more than a century
ago that hardly a political issue arose in the United States that was not
converted into a legal question and taken to the courts for decision."1
So it was then and so it is today. Americans, unlike any other people,
are in the peculiar habit of committing their most critical social,
economic, political, and philosophical questions to legal actions so
that the judiciary may participate in their resolution. Over the decades,
the judiciary has helped resolve these critical issues, while storms
have arisen in the American polity over the direction in which the
judiciary has led. Lawyers and political scientists, as well as members
of the Supreme Court itself, have joined in the fray to attempt to
answer the question: What is the proper role of the Supreme Court in
the American governmental and political system? Should the Justices
ignore the political aspects of their task-the public consequences of
their decisions? Should they ask themselves the question "What substantive result is best for the country?" Or should they be content to
answer the question "What is the decision according to law?" Different Courts have leaned in different directions, and the dilemma remains.
This book is an attempt by a former Solicitor General of the
United States (1961-1965), who is presently a professor at Harvard
Law School, to show that the Supreme Court under the Chief
Justiceship of Earl Warren has met the dilemma head on and solved it
in an acceptable manner. Professor Cox admits that his view may be
prejudiced. One who sits in the Supreme Court almost daily awaiting
oral argument or the delivery of opinions, he tells us,
... Ealcquires both admiration and affection for the Court and for all the
justices. The problems with which they deal are so difficult, the number
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and variety of cases are so overwhelming, the implications are so farreaching, that one sits humbled by the demands upon them. That the
institution of constitutional adjudication works so well on the whole is
testimony not only to the genius of2 the institution but to the wisdom and
courage of the individual justices.

In fact, however, Professor Cox has produced a remarkably well
balanced overview of the Warren Court, up to but not including the
last term, in such a brief, well-written, and non-technical form that
it will be valuable for the general reader as well as the student of
constitutional law.
The thesis of The Warren Court is that the seemingly insoluble
antinomy lying at the heart of constitutional adjudication can be eased
through legal reasoning that preserves "the power of judge-made law
to command consent while at the same time changing it to serve the
new and newly felt needs of the community and the demands of
individual justice."5 In other words, the Supreme Court must preserve
the respect and confidence of the people and, at the same time, permit
and promote social progress. This is done by rationalizing constitutional
judgements in terms of principles consistent with accepted sources of
law. The author asks whether the Warren Court, which has rewritten,
often with more profound social consequences than any other, major
constitutional doctrines governing race relations, the administration of
criminal justice, and the operation of the political process, has been able
to attain an acceptable balance of progress as it is viewed by both
the liberal and conservative elements of our society? The author
believes so. He is confident, he tells us, "that historians will write that
the trend of decisions during the 1950's and 1960's was in keeping with
the mainstream of American history-a bit progressive but also
moderate, a bit humane but not sentimental, a bit idealistic but seldom
doctrinaire, and in the long run essentially pragmatic-in short, in
keeping with the true genius of our institutions."4
Cox points out that the Warren Court's difficulties were increased
by the pressing and urgent nature of a number of forces existing in our
society: the demand for racial justice, the movement toward equalitarianism, the concern for personal liberty and privacy, and finally the
force of new knowledge in the fields of psychology and sociology that
cast doubt upon such traditional notions as the efficacy of punishment
and deterrence in criminal law.
Professor Cox supports his thesis, which he introduces along with
a brief historical glance at the dilemma of the judiciary in his first
2 Id. at 134.

3 Id.at 23.
4 Id. at 133.
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chapter, with five well-organized chapters arranged around the central
themes of judicial and legislative power in civil rights, the reform of
criminal procedure, and finally, political democracy with specific attention to freedom of speech and association, voting rights, and
legislative reapportionment. The author cites, in developing these
themes and supporting his thesis, specific cases and records personal
observations drawn from his experiences as the government's advocate.
He displays intimate and thorough familiarity with his subject and
provides the reader with valuable insights. This reviewer's only complaint is that placing the footnotes at the end of the book caused minor
inconvenience which should have been avoided by the publisher.
Professor Cox is not completely uncritical of the Court's work over
the past fifteen years. He notes that the Court's majority has been
particularly unsuccessful in rationalizing new departures under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In addition, he
feels that some of the innovations wrought in the area of criminal procedure have been too rapid. Cox seems especially concerned about the
Court's apparent failure to deal with the questions raised by the
radical revisions in the structure of government that will result from
shifting ultimate judicial responsibility from the state to the federal
level, as in the administration of crminal justice.
Overall, the author believes that while there are areas of virtually
unprecedented creativity, the "Warren Court has recognized that there
are limits to what can be accomplished by Constitutional adjudication
without undue risk of undermining the rule of law."5 The true greatness of the Warren Court is that it has been able to pursue what it saw
as the goals of society without impairing the long-run usefulness of
judge-made law. In so doing it has made a significant contribution to
the continuing progress of the American people.
W. Edmund Moomaw
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Eastern Kentucky University

